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Abstract 
 
The resulting housing solutions developed for permanent shelter as part of aid 
packages and reconstruction often belie the complexity of their resolution. This 
paper briefly outlines the often hidden subtleties in such designs and in 
particular the complexity that “mitigation” can require. Mitigation is the accepted 
“notion” that any reconstruction should address former issues by reducing those 
perceived problems and issues. The hope is that they can be completed 
eliminated so that the disaster does not happen again. This may not always be 
achievable.  
 
The development of a permanent shelter reconstruction program for the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for tsunami victims on the 
west Coast of Aceh, North Sumatra is documented. And in this program the 
obvious mitigation need was for “tsunami proofing” of housing. Drawing on the 
tsunami report by Wilkinson, the paper highlights the process, design and 
planning considered as part of this mitigation and the practicalities of 
“balancing” the wishes of people to return home to sites ravaged by the tsunami 
against the responsibility to ensure “safe” housing (Wilkinson, 2005). The 
starkness of the engineering “numbers” against the social costs is compelling 
and the paper highlights in practical terms the difficulties sometimes faced to 
reduce and thus “mitigate”.   
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DEVELOPMENT OF A PERMANENT SHELTER STRATEGY 
 
The development of any shelter program requires answers to three main questions:  
“What” do we build? 
“Where” do we build? 
“Whom” do we build for? 
  
The first question of what to build was addressed by a spatial survey of low cost 
housing in Banda Aceh (USAID 1996).  
 
A SPATIAL SURVEY OF LOW COST HOUSING IN BANDAR ACEH. 
 
The need to recognise local standards and norms into any proposed house design was 
understood by all the NGO’s and UN Agencies involved in permanent shelter in Aceh 
(Fox 2004). However, there was not full agreement on how that should be achieved. 
Our approach was to initiate a spatial survey of low cost housing complexes in Bandar 
Aceh. The aim was to ensure that whatever the house design the size and scale of the 
house was comparable (and preferably slightly less) than existing low cost houses. 
Otherwise, provision of “better” housing to tsunami victims could generate long term 
jealousies within the community. On the other hand it is debatable that the provision of 
a “mortgage” free house (when those living in Government low cost houses were often 
paying it off over 20 years) would not generate such jealousies nonetheless? This 
dilemma could never be resolved short of not helping those in need. And consequently, 
the integrated programs (housing together with schools, roads, water sources, 
mosques, health clinics etc) had to be managed so that existing communities also felt 
that they were “benefiting”. This was never going to be simple.  
 
Over 30 such housing complexes were reviewed and it was noted that an Acehnese 
house had the following four main “zones” with the following typical dimensions and 
areas:  
• Porch area 4.00m2 and average dimensions of 2.61m by 1.43m.   
• Living/ lounge area 14.26m2 and average dimensions of 4.68m by 3.03m. 
• Kitchen 10.09m2 with average dimensions of 3.78 by 2.54 metres  
• Toilet/bathing area 4.31m2 with average dimensions of 2.28 by 1.84 metres.  
 
   
Figure 1: Low Cost Houses for Hospital, Police and Government Workers. 
 
Low cost houses typically had two bedrooms. But the inclusion of separate bedrooms 
into the UNHCR proposed house was abandoned in favour of one common living area 
or lounge area. Families would initially live in the living/ lounge area and subsequently 
extend the house to suit their requirements. This subtle but important design aspect 
was not well understood but can be understood when one considers the family 
demographics. For example, if the family consisted of one set of parents and children of 
the same gender then a two bedroom house would “fit”. However, if the children were of 
different genders or if there were grand parents staying in the house as well then a two 
bedroom house would not be sufficient. Who would “sleep on the couch?” Moreover, 
the “two bedroom house” design did not lend itself to modification. Thus, for the latter 
family not only would someone be sleeping on the couch but the family would be 
helpless to easily alter the house to better accommodate the family. Such a situation is 
unsustainable from several points of view and hence the development of the core house 
concept. 
 
The size of the core house would vary by changing the length of the lounge area (while 
holding the width of the house) for different family sizes as follows: 
Family size up to 4 people  3.2 metres length of lounge area 
5-7 people    4.8 metres length of lounge area 
8-9 people    6.4 metres length of lounge area 
10+ people   Special design. 
 
It is interesting that the above dimensions were based on the logistical requirements for 
the corrugated iron. In Indonesia the thickest corrugated iron sheet is 0.4 mm thick 
(compared to the thinnest section of 0.55 mm used in New Zealand). When stacked 
sheet lengths longer than 1.8 metres can not be lifted with a fork truck without buckling 
and consequently this is the maximum sheet length. Allowing for roof angle and sheet 
over lap results in a working plan dimension of 1.6 metres and hence the above room 
sizes. Failure to recognise this would result in excessive (and unnecessary) wastage. 
 
  
Figure 2: The UNHCR Permanent Shelter House or “Core” House  
 
An Acehnese house (much like many South East Asian communities) actually has two 
kitchens. One is a “dry” kitchen and the other is a “wet” kitchen. Unlike many “western” 
households where food such as chicken arrives frozen ready for storage and later 
cooking. In an Acehnese household the food arrives “alive” and for example chickens 
would need to be killed, plucked and cooked. All this would be completed in the “wet” 
kitchen with the cooking of rice and eating meals being done in the “dry” kitchen.  The 
“core” house only provided the “wet” kitchen which was also the case in many modern 
low cost housing complexes reviewed.  
 
From this work evolved the UNHCR “core” house drawn and photographed in figure 2 
above. 
 
HARMONISED PERMANENT HOUSE DESIGN FOR UN AGENCIES AND NGO’s 
 
An agreement was also reached between the UN Agencies and NGO’s in Aceh 
involved in permanent shelter regarding house specifications. This agreement was 
intended to eliminate (or at least minimise) any significant differences between the 
housing aid programs offered by the different agencies. The following was agreed:   
 
• Houses would have concrete floor    
• Houses would have a corrugated iron roof 
• The house cladding material was left up to each Agency. 
 
The final decision of the cladding material was left to each Agency in developing their 
permanent shelter program. At the time it was felt that specification of the cladding 
would result in a “monotone” housing landscape. Moreover, there were several 
competing values associated with the selection of the cladding material and together 
with a lack of site resource information made any such selection premature. These 
competing values made any selection complex and the selection of the cladding 
material for the UNHCR house is discussed in more detail later in this paper. That 
aside, this agreement was a major achievement and one that was particularly 
appreciated by those NGO’s with large programs.  
 
THE SELECTION OF THE HOUSE CLADDING MATERIAL 
  
Three locally used cladding materials were identified namely: 
• Timber 
• Concrete Block with grouted infill 
• Brick with a concrete frame. 
 
Examples of these (taken from the Spatial Survey) are shown in figure 3 below. Other 
options such as styrene foam boards, rice board, bamboo and rammed earth were not 
considered as it was felt that the use of non local materials could be easily rejected by 
beneficiaries despite any “technical” advantages.  
 
However, such options were not discarded completely but because of the complexity of 
the issues involved it was felt that further complication with a new material would not be 
advisable. Consequently, only these three options were studied. 
  
Timber Concrete Block Brick with a Concrete 
Frame. 
Figure 3: Local Cladding Options for Low Cost Permanent Housing in Aceh 
 
The complexity of what is apparently a straight forward issue can be gauged from table 
1 below. Many do not understand the “balancing” process involved in selecting cladding 
nor the process and design of shelter let alone permanent shelter. Nonetheless, this 
has to be done and initially because of cost it was felt that the cladding selection tended 
towards timber but with the proviso that availability be confirmed at each location. This 
was countered by the need to complete a sustainability evaluation and the need to 
ensure that a sustainable harvesting scheme was adopted. There was a concern with 
the perceived quality of timber over the other two hard surface materials. This was 
confirmed both by UNHCR’s spatial survey of low cost housing in Bandar Aceh and by 
national construction figures obtained from BPS (Indonesian Government Statistics  
Department) that 95% and 94% of houses had hard surfaces. This was countered by 
the traditional wooden house (more common in rural areas) and the feeling amongst 
UNHCR national staff in Bandar Aceh that if you did not have a house than any house 
was a better option. Thus, in the initial stages timber appeared to have potential 
advantages over the other two options.  
 
This was followed by intense concerns based in part around the East Timor Shelter 
program experience that the selection of the cladding (and the complete permanent 
shelter solution) was largely a question of logistics and procurement (UNHCR, 2001). 
The impact of at least the logistic issue can be seen in the number of 40 kg bags of 
cement that are required for each of the housing types. A timber house requires 25 
bags while a concrete block house requires 100 bags (4 times that of the timber house) 
and a brick house requires 150 bags (6 times that of the timber house option). Given 
that corrugated iron and cement would be the two “bulky” and heavy items to be 
potentially transported to site underlines the impact of the above figures. On the face of 
it this would appear to also favour timber but the difficulty of grading, quality control and 
procurement meant that timber also had a down side. 
 
 
 
Table 1: Competing Issues for Different House Cladding Options 
Issue Timber Concrete Block Brick with a Concrete 
Frame 
Cost1  19,000,000 Rph  22,000,000 Rph  26,000,000 Rph. 
Cement 
Usage2 
25 bags each 40 kg 100 bags each 40 kg 
(not including cement in 
concrete blocks). 
150 bags each 40 kg 
 Building 
Expertise 
low  high  High 
Quality 
Perception 
Lower quality material Higher quality material. 
94% of buildings have 
“solid” walls. 
Higher quality material. 
94% of buildings have 
“solid” walls. 
Material Life 2-5 years 30+ years 30+ years 
Specification 
Issues 
Highest. Previous 
experience suggests 
issues of grading, 
source, durability and  
problems with 
Medium. Skilled trades 
people required for 
concrete and block 
laying 
Medium. Skilled trades 
people required for 
concrete and brick laying 
Capacity 
Building 
Good Better Better 
Seismic 
Design 
Light seismic loads and 
better seismic 
performance 
Heavy seismic loads and 
the need for specific 
seismic design and 
detailing to achieve 
acceptable seismic 
performance. 
Heavy seismic loads and 
the need for specific 
seismic design and 
detailing to achieve 
acceptable seismic 
performance. 
Construction 
time 
1.-2 weeks 4 weeks 4 weeks 
Sustainability 
Issues 
Deforestation and 
potential erosion 
Embodied energy and 
source of materials 
Embodied energy and 
source of materials 
Thermal 
Properties 
Fast to heat and cool Slow to heat but slow to 
cool 
Slow to heat but slow to 
cool 
Material 
resources at 
site 
Timber is anticipated as 
being available in 
Lhoong and Lamno 
areas. Confirmed 
availability in 
Calang/Krueng Sabe but 
is not expected to be 
readily available further 
south in Teunom 
Sand, aggregates and 
stone are available in 
Calang/Krueng Sabe 
and are anticipated to be 
available in Lhoong and 
Lamno but is not 
expected to be readily 
available further south in 
Teunom 
Suitable clay materials 
for bricks could be 
expected between 
Lhoong and 
Calang/Krueng Sabe but 
is not expected to be 
readily available further 
south in Teunom. 
Tsunami 
debris 
generation. 
high  low  Low 
Notes 1: Based on Bandar Aceh prices (March 2005) with no ceiling or painting and no plastering of the 
concrete block and brick options. 
2. This does not include the cement required for the concrete block production. 
 
 
 
Those with experience from earlier shelter programs both in Indonesia and Sri Lanka 
were strongly suggesting the use of light gauge steel sections and the use of hard 
surface materials.  
 
Work by UNHCR’s Tsunami/Coastal Protection expert pointed to the need for the 
reduction of debri and that timber houses within any potential tsunami zone (within 3.5 
kilometres of the shore line) should be restricted or preferably eliminated (Wilkinson, 
2005). The presence of timber not only doubles the tsunami loads on other buildings (by 
increasing the “density” of the water flow) but also creates “projectiles” within the 
tsunami itself that increases any death toll.  
 
From this apparent melting pot developed the view that the paramount issues for the 
cladding selection were the following: 
 
• The quality of the material 
• The durability of the material 
• The perception of timber being an inferior material. 
 
And despite logistical and cost disadvantages the house cladding material should be 
concrete block.   
 
The selection of concrete block over brick was made not only because of cost (though 
this appears to be significant itself) but because of concerns relating to structural 
integrity, thermal comfort, weathering and constructability. In all these areas concrete 
block has advantages (though at times marginally so) over brick but taken overall these 
constitute a definitive preference.  
 
TSUNAMI PROOFING 
 
It was accepted by the humanitarian community that the issue of tsunami design should 
be addressed and that new houses should be have better “tsunami proofing” where 
previously there was none (Molin-Valdes 2003). The first suggestion by central 
Government was to build houses outside a “green zone” of 3 kilometres from the shore 
line. This was decisively rejected by the local authorities in Aceh. Moreover, victims had 
already started moving back to their original house sites and had started erecting 
temporary shelters. Thus aid agencies were faced with the dilemma of assisting victims 
to rebuild in areas that were clearly tsunami risks.  And it was anticipated that a smaller 
tsunami wave than the 10+ metre event that occurred on December 26 2004 would be 
sufficient for design. The assumption was that the December event was “rare”.  
 
However, expert advice was that this event was not rare and had a return period of 
once every 100 years (Wilkinson, 2005). It was in effect the engineering design event. 
Moreover, the Wilkinson report also stated that in the next 30-40 years that the return 
period of a tsunami in the area was of the order of 1 in 35 years. To make matters 
worse, the report also concluded that an early warning system would not work for the 
habitants along the west coast of Sumatra (including Banda Aceh) and thus other 
options had to be investigated. These options were as follows: 
• Safe haven (natural) 
• Safe havens (constructed) 
• Moving people away from the coast 
 
Though there was a 15-20 minute time lapse after the earthquake before the tsunami 
came a shore, 10 minutes of that time was taken up by severe ground shaking. People 
could not move. Consequently, the “evacuation” time was as little as 10 minutes and 
based on this it was estimated that any safe havens would have to be no further than 
250 metres away from houses. Unfortunately for most (if not all of the west coast area) 
this meant that there were minimal natural safe havens such as hills. And those safe 
havens would need to be constructed. Moulds were quickly deleted from any further 
considerations. Besides being 10+ metres in height to match the tsunami they also had 
to be another 15 metres to protect against the tsunami run up. Cost and space simply 
made such an option impractical.  Steel frames were also considered but again would 
be required at 500 metres spacing in village areas and would have to be designed for 
the full tsunami loads which would have been in the order of 50-100 times the required 
code seismic loads. Housing budgets would be taken up quickly by such structures. 
 
And there remained the issue of early warning. Certainly one could evacuate at every 
earthquake but not every earthquake will result in a tsunami. 
 
Thus, the conclusion was that people would have to shift to higher ground. And this was 
the position of the Wilkinson report. 
 
Unfortunately, in almost all the areas along the west coast the Indonesian Government 
and Local Government confirmed that there was no land to move tsunami victims to. 
And more over people did not want to move away from their original sites and their 
associated (but diminished) communities. Thus, at least in the immediate future moving 
was in most (if not all) cases not possible. (And moreover, would quickly out price itself 
if land purchases were to go ahead).  
 
Thus the conclusion for many of the tsunami victims was that they would suffer a similar 
event potentially within the next 40 years. And the consequent dilemma for aid agencies 
was should they assist by building new homes back on tsunami risk sites? 
 
It was clear that mitigation against the tsunami, despite good intentions was not 
feasible. And as noted by Quarantelli people in such situations faced by a “… lack of 
data and inadequate preparedness of citizens has led residents to respond in the only 
way they thought they could save themselves – prayer. In a survey of two coastal 
communities in Bangladesh struck by a cyclone, it was found that “praying to Allah” was 
undertaken by 73 percent of residents in one village and 90 percent in another. In both 
localities, it was the most frequent precautionary measure taken” (Quarantelli 2002). 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This shelter program (and others) has been described as constructing thousands of 
“garages”. And while on the face of it this is correct such a comparison belies the 
complexity of such shelter programs. A complexity that required both spatial surveys 
and detailed analysis for the cladding selection. 
 
Moreover, when this is combined with the need to “mitigate” further highlights the 
complexity of such an apparently “simple garage”.   
  
And what about building houses back in tsunami risk areas? The decision to put 
Indonesia nationals back into risky situations is one that no agency should make and 
the decision must rest with Indonesian Government (or its representative).  
 
Shelter programs are complex and sometimes the option to mitigate is not possible.  
This is disturbing. 
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